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As online social media grow, it is increasingly important to distinguish
between the different threats to privacy that arise from the conversion of our
social interactions into data. One well-recognized threat is from the robust
concentrations of electronic information aggregated into colossal databases.
Yet much of this same information is also consumed socially and dispersed
through a user interface to hundreds, if not thousands, of peer users.
In order to distinguish relationally shared information from the threat of the
electronic database, this essay identifies the massive amounts of personal
information shared via the user interface of social technologies as “social
data.” The main thesis of this essay is that, unlike electronic databases, which
are the focus of the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), there are no
commonly accepted principles to guide the recent explosion of voluntarily
adopted practices, industry codes, and laws that address social data.
This essay aims to remedy that by proposing three social data principles—a
sort of FIPPs for the front-end of social media: the Boundary Regulation
Principle, the Identity Integrity Principle, and the Network Integrity Principle.
These principles can help courts, policymakers, and organizations create more
consistent and effective rules regarding the use of social data.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The predominant response to the industrial-scale collection and use of
personal information has been to structure both voluntary and compulsory
privacy protections around a set of commonly accepted principles known as the
Fair Information Practice Principles, often referred to as the FIPPs.1 While the
FIPPs have played an important role in the systematic protection of personal
data stored in electronic databases, they are woefully insufficient for the publicfacing side of a different but related technology: social media.2
Social media is defined broadly here as any digital communication
technology utilizing the Internet to connect people for social reasons. Social
media and electronic databases represent two distinct threats that are often
conflated. Social media are certainly part of the “big data” phenomenon.3 It is
1 See, e.g., Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User

Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 242 (2013); see also
Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History, Version 1.92, BOB GELLMAN
1 (June 24, 2013), http://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPShistory.pdf (discussing the
development of the Fair Information Practices in the United States).
2 The term “social media” is notoriously difficult to define. At its broadest, it can refer
to every Internet-based communication technology. Eric Goldman, Big Problems in
California’s New Law Restricting Employers’ Access to Employees’ Online Accounts,
FORBES (Sept. 28, 2012, 12:39 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2012/09/28/
big-problems-in-californias-new-law-restricting-employers-access-to-employees-onlineaccounts/ (noting that laws proposed to regulate social media instead cover “effectively all
digital content and activity, both on the Internet and stored in local storage devices, not just
social media” and that “it’s not possible to define ‘social media’ as a subset of the Internet
ecosystem”). However, a more circumscribed definition is offered by danah boyd and Nicole
Ellison for the related term “social network site,” as “web-based services that allow
individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse
their list of connections and those made by others within the system.” danah m. boyd &
Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 211 (2008).
3 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION
THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 91–94 (2013); Julie E. Cohen,

2013]

SOCIAL DATA

997

hardly a secret that Facebook, Twitter, and other social media have robust
concentrations of electronic information aggregated into colossal databases.4
Yet much of this same information is also consumed socially and dispersed
through a user interface to hundreds, if not thousands, of peer users. In order to
distinguish this relationally shared information from information in databases
and the nascent concept of “big data,” this essay will refer to the massive
amounts of personal information shared via the user interface of social
technologies as “social data.” Social interaction is messy and contextual in the
extreme and, like with electronic databases, social data-protection initiatives
could benefit from guiding principles and a common language for policy
objectives.
Yet unlike electronic databases, there are no commonly accepted principles
to guide the recent explosion of voluntarily adopted practices, industry codes,
What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1918–19 (2013) (“Efforts to repackage
pervasive surveillance as innovation—under the moniker ‘Big Data’—are better understood
as efforts to enshrine the methods and values of the modulated society at the heart of our
system of knowledge production.”); Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy SelfManagement and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1889–90 (2013)
(“Modern data analytics, which is also loosely referred to as data mining or ‘Big Data,’ can
deduce extensive information about a person from these clues. In other words, little bits of
innocuous data can say a lot in combination.”); Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 1, at 242
(“For the past four decades, the tension between data innovation and informational privacy
has been moderated by a set of principles broadly referred to as the Fair Information Practice
Principles (FIPPs) . . . . The big data paradigm challenges some of these fundamental
principles . . . .”).
4 Privacy and security expert Bruce Schneier has developed a very useful taxonomy of
Social Networking Data:
• Service data is the data you give to a social networking site in order to use it. Such
data might include your legal name, your age, and your credit-card number.
• Disclosed data is what you post on your own pages: blog entries, photographs,
messages, comments, and so on.
• Entrusted data is what you post on other people’s pages. It’s basically the same stuff
as disclosed data, but the difference is that you don’t have control over the data once
you post it—another user does.
• Incidental data is what other people post about you: a paragraph about you that
someone else writes, a picture of you that someone else takes and posts. Again, it’s
basically the same stuff as disclosed data, but the difference is that you don’t have
control over it, and you didn’t create it in the first place.
• Behavioral data is data the site collects about your habits by recording what you do
and who you do it with. It might include games you play, topics you write about, news
articles you access (and what that says about your political leanings), and so on.
• Derived data is data about you that is derived from all the other data. For example, if
80 percent of your friends self-identify as gay, you’re likely gay yourself.

Bruce Schneier, A Revised Taxonomy of Social Networking Data, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY
(Aug. 10, 2010, 6:51 AM), http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/08/a_taxonomy_of
_s_1.html (emphasis added); see also Bruce Schneier, A Taxonomy of Social Networking
Data, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, July–Aug. 2010, at 88, 88.
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and laws that address social data. While existing common law and statutes
cover some of the problems presented by social media, the legal response to
social data is becoming disjointed.5 The purpose of this essay is to propose a set
of general guiding principles for the protection of social data and to explore
various ways in which these principles might be implemented—a sort of FIPPs
for the front-end of social media.
To that end, this essay proposes three general principles for the protection
of social data:
1) Those interacting with social data should respect an individual’s
expressed boundaries.
2) Those interacting with social data should respect the integrity of an
individual’s expressed identity.
3) Those interacting with social data should respect the integrity of an
expressed social network.
These principles, which can be referred to as the Boundary Regulation
Principle, the Identity Integrity Principle, and the Network Integrity Principle,
address many of the privacy-related interests of social media users in a specific
way without substantially overlapping the FIPPs and distinct, well-established
areas of the law, such as intellectual property and defamation. These principles
can already be seen in new and proposed rules and laws related to social data,
though if they are not organized into coherent principles, courts, policymakers,
and organizations risk haphazard and inconsistent rules regarding the use of
social data.
Part II of this essay will explore the need for social data principles,
including the conflation of threats presented by databases and other social
media users, the insufficiency of the FIPPs for social data, and the seemingly
haphazard onslaught of new voluntary codes and compulsory regulations aimed
at protecting social data. Part III of this essay will propose the three general
principles for the protection of social data, including their normative
underpinning and current examples of problems that arise when the principles
are not respected. Part IV will suggest various ways to implement the social
data principles, including disclosure limitations, design requirements, and
limitations on the use of social technologies and requests for social data. This
essay concludes by noting that although principles like the social data principles
are not without weaknesses, like the FIPPs, they are preferable for consistency
and consensus to the haphazard promulgation of rules or the failure to articulate
a common language and generally mutual goals to wrestle with the issues
presented by social data.

5 See infra Part II.B.
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II. THE NEED FOR SOCIAL DATA PRINCIPLES
In his article Saving Facebook, James Grimmelmann rejected commercial
data collection rules, which are evocative of the FIPPs, as a means to protect
against what he saw as “peer-produced privacy violations.” Grimmelmann
stated: “[e]ven if the government left Facebook completely alone, and Facebook
showed no advertisements to its users, and no other company ever had access to
Facebook’s data, most of the [privacy-related] problems we’ve seen would
remain.”6 Grimmelmann adeptly articulated a primary concern in disclosing
social data when he stated, “we worry about what our parents, friends, exes, and
employers will see, just as much as we worry about what malevolent strangers
will see.”7
The FIPPs, which have evolved over time, have remained almost entirely
focused on one technology: the database.8 The FIPPs provide for general
guiding principles to ensure concepts like limitations on data collection and use,
data quality, reasonable security safeguards for data, transparency for
collections of personal data, and accountability for data controllers.9 The laws
that embrace the FIPPs are also, at their core, legal responses to the threats
posed by electronic databases, such as HIPAA and the Privacy Act, which deal
with limitations on the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of
personally identifiable information about individuals maintained in records
systems like databases.
Grimmelmann noted that the concerns that drive commercial data collection
rules like the FIPPs are not really applicable to many threats faced by social
media users. Grimmelmann stated:
[t]hese are not concerns about powerful entities looking down on the network
from above; they’re concerns about individuals looking at each other from
ground level. Even if Facebook were perfectly ethical and completely discreet,
users would still create false profiles, snoop on each other, and struggle over
the bounds of the private.10

Social data principles are needed because the current laws, guidelines, and
company policies and design strategies need a common language and policy
objective to consistently capture the range of problems posed by social data.
The emerging laws designed to fill that gap are increasingly disjointed and

6 James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1188 (2009).
7 Id.
8 See generally Gellman, supra note 1; Bartosz M. Marcinkowski, Privacy

Paradox(es): In Search of a Transatlantic Data Protection Standard, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1167
(2013).
9 Gellman, supra note 1; see also Claudia Diaz, Omer Tene & Seda Gürses, Hero or
Villain: The Data Controller in Privacy Law and Technologies, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 923 (2013).
10 Grimmelmann, supra note 6, at 1189.
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haphazard.11 The FIPPs are largely inapplicable to problems that arise when
individuals interact with each other at the “social” level. These interactions are
instead reliant upon a loose patchwork of torts, statutes, regulations, contracts,
employer policies, and industry guides, which have failed to meaningfully
coalesce to give the handlers and subjects of social data clear guidance and
common goals.
An attempt to find common social data goals is daunting in light of the
highly contextual and divergent vulnerabilities wrought by social data. But it is
important in light of the resulting harm that can come from peer and outsider
misuse of that data. Facebook users alone face a laundry list of harms, ranging
from malicious disclosures by faithless “friends”12 to harms resulting from
well-intentioned or accidental disclosures.13 Many employees have lost their
jobs when employers access social data.14 Others have suffered loss as the result
of judgments made based on decontextualized or misinterpreted social data,
such as the Canadian woman who lost her benefits for the treatment of
depression due to the cheerful disposition she displayed on her Facebook
profile.15
Many social data harms extend beyond pecuniary loss and include
emotional and social harms as well. Consider Bobbi Duncan and Taylor
McCormick, to whom the dangers of social data were made abundantly clear.16
The sexual preferences of these two students at the University of Texas were
inadvertently revealed to their parents when they were added to the Facebook
group for Queer Chorus, a student organization.17 Although both students were
allegedly sophisticated users who attempted to obfuscate their online activity
from their parents, their privacy settings were not respected by the “Groups”
Facebook function, which allows Facebook users to be added to a group by a
11 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 2.
12 See, e.g., Will Ripley, Denver Man Fired for Complaining About Work on Facebook,

9NEWS.COM (May 7, 2013, 10:22 PM), http://www.9news.com/news/article/
334929/222/Denver-man-fired-for-complaining-about-work-on-Facebook (“‘I got to a point
where I put a comment on Facebook that got me fired,’ [employee] said. [Employee]’s
coworker reported him to their boss.”).
13 See Geoffrey A. Fowler, When the Most Personal Secrets Get Outed on Facebook,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044416580457
8008740578200224.html.
14 FACEBOOK FIRED, https://thefacebookfired.wordpress.com/ (last visited Aug. 22,
2013) (aggregating links to stories about employees fired as a result of postings made on
Facebook and other social media); see also Daniel Solove, Employers and Schools that
Demand Account Passwords and the Future of Cloud Privacy, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June
3, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/06/employers-andschools-that-demand-account-passwords-and-the-future-of-cloud-privacy.html.
15 Bruce Watson, Facebook Spying Costs Canadian Woman Her Health Benefits,
DAILYFINANCE (Nov. 23, 2009, 5:30 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/11/23/
facebook-spying-costs-canadian-woman-her-health-benefits/.
16 Fowler, supra note 13.
17 Id.
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friend without their approval.18 The creator of the choir’s Facebook group did
not realize that adding users to the group automatically reported the users’ new
membership to their Facebook “friends.”19
Such accidental disclosures—as well as more malicious ones—highlight the
need for more focused design-based solutions to privacy as well as
organizational policies that better articulate the boundaries of disclosure, such
as whether the choir’s Facebook page should have been set to “private” instead
of “public,” or whether Facebook’s software should better incorporate the
expressed wishes of its users as part of the “privacy by design” initiative.20
Established information practice principles could guide these decisions.
But the FIPPs are a poor fit to help Ms. Duncan, Mr. McCormick, and the
countless other Internet users who have experienced the harmful consequences
of others disclosing and interacting with social data. This Part will briefly
explore the various threats posed by social data, as well as the insufficiency of
established laws to respond to those threats and the haphazard nature of the
emerging social data protections that seek to fill the void.

A. The Threat of Peers and Outsiders
Social media produce data that exists both on the “front end” and “back
end” of the technology.21 One piece of information, such as a shared photo or
status update, can simultaneously be presented via a user interface as social data
as well as aggregated into a database for commercial purposes. Thus, when
discussing the threats to personal information disclosed on social media, it is
important to distinguish between data contexts and properly situate the potential
harm at issue. This can be difficult given the increased media attention to the
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See

ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN 1 (2009), available at
http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/privacybydesign.pdf; see also FTC, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES
AND POLICYMAKERS, at vii (2012), available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyre
port.pdf; Article 29 Data Protection Working Party & Working Party on Police and Justice,
The Future of Privacy, at 3 (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/
policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2009/wp168_en.pdf; Directive 95/46/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31; Travis D. Breaux & Annie I. Antón, Analyzing Regulatory Rules for
Privacy and Security Requirements, 34 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SOFTWARE ENGINEERING 5,
10 (2008); Ira S. Rubinstein, Regulating Privacy by Design, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1409,
1421 (2011) (“Privacy by design is an amorphous concept.”); Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel
Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and Facebook Privacy
Incidents 4 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 12-43, 2012), available at
https://www.privacyassociation.org/media/pdf/events_and_programs/Privacy%20by%20Des
ign-A%20Counterfactual%20Analysis.pdf.
21 See Schneier, supra note 4.
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topic of privacy on the Internet that tends to conflate social media harms. For
example, the Wall Street Journal has produced an impressive collection of
stories about digital privacy under the title What They Know.22 But it is not
clear, at least initially, whether “they” refers to websites, third-party advertising
networks, governments, employers, other users, or all of the above.
One helpful metaphor for distinguishing the database privacy threat from
the user interface privacy threat is the stage.23 Information that is collected by
websites and applications and stored in databases exists “backstage.” This data
collection and use, which is typically not visible to users, is what is most
commonly referenced when referring to “data protection.”24 Backstage data
underlies such concepts as “digital dossiers”25 and “the database of ruin,”26 and
is the aim of most privacy-related statutes and the FIPPs.27
Meanwhile social data is best viewed as existing on the “front stage,” in the
sense that it is visible to other users via the user interface of social technologies.
While the danger created by electronic databases lies in the concentration of the
information, social data is dangerous due to the high number of potential
harmful actors and the amorphous, semi-private nature of information disclosed
via social technologies. Airi Lampinen observed, “[c]onventional privacy and
computer security studies focus on threats and risks created by faceless third
parties. In social media, end-user privacy concerns are more than before related
to real second parties[—]people who are known also offline and who are
anything but faceless.”28
Some of the most prominent examples of technologies that aid in the
creation of social data are social network sites, but the concept also extends to
22 What They Know, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/public/page/what-they-knowdigital-privacy.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013).
23 See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 22–30 (1973).
For Goffman, “backstage” was a place where one could be more free to be one’s self without
as many prying eyes. Id. at 111–40. The back stage identified in this Article refers to limited
visibility. Many website users can theoretically see “front stage” data, while only an
organization and authorized intermediaries have initial lawful access to “backstage” data.
24 See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 357 (“Although most industrialized nations have
comprehensive data protection laws, the United States has maintained a sectoral approach
where certain industries are covered and others are not. In particular, emerging companies
known as ‘commercial data brokers’ have frequently slipped through the cracks of U.S.
privacy law.”).
25 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004); Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records,
Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2002).
26 Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1748 (2010).
27 See Gellman, supra note 1, at 2.
28 Airi Lampinen, Practices of Balancing Privacy and Publicness in Social Network
Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ACM INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING
GROUP WORK 343, 343 (2010), available at http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1890000/18801
42/p343-lampinen.pdf.
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other technologies such as blogs, bulletin boards, games, and any other digital
medium used to socialize within an online community. Since the focus of social
data is on context, actors, and information, difficult and potentially artificial
distinctions between the different kinds of social technologies are largely
unnecessary.
Thinking of social data and database information as existing on a front stage
and back stage, respectively, is helpful when comparing the two—a necessary
step in developing distinct principles. Social data is similar to “big data,” if in
no other way, in sheer magnitude. Yet instead of more data being aggregated
into one centralized location, social data’s largeness comes from the enormous
number of disclosers and recipients, each contributing a relatively small amount
of data. According to the Pew Internet & American Life Project, as of May
2013, seventy-two percent of online adults use social networking sites.29 As of
August 2012, forty-six percent of adult internet users post original photos or
videos online that they themselves have created.30 Forty-one percent of adult
internet users take photos or videos that they have found online and repost them
on sites designed for sharing images with many people.31
According to other sources, in one day on the Internet:
Enough information is consumed to fill 168 million DVDs. 294 billion emails
are sent. 2 million blog posts are written (enough posts to fill TIME magazine
for 770 million years). 172 million people visit Facebook. 40 million visit
Twitter. 22 million visit LinkedIn. 20 million visit Google+. 17 million visit
Pinterest. 4.7 billion minutes are spent on Facebook. 532 million statuses are
updated. 250 million photos are uploaded. . . . 864,000 hours of video are
uploaded to YouTube. More than 35 million apps are downloaded. More
iPhones are sold than people are born.32

There are a number of important differences between front stage and
backstage data. Unlike online information that is disclosed and used in the
commercial, financial, and healthcare context, social data is often disseminated
online for enjoyment or emotional support, to create and strengthen
relationships and communities, or for simple self-promotion.33 Although
29 JOANNA BRENNER & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., 72% OF ONLINE ADULTS

ARE SOCIAL NETWORKING SITE USERS 2 (2013), available at http://pewinternet.org/
~/media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_Social_networking_sites_update.pdf.
30 LEE RAINIE ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR, PHOTOS AND VIDEOS AS SOCIAL CURRENCY
ONLINE 2 (2012), available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_On
lineLifeinPictures_PDF.pdf.
31 Id.
32 Cara Pring, 100 Social Media, Mobile and Internet Statistics for 2012 (March),
SOCIAL SKINNY (Mar. 21, 2012), http://thesocialskinny.com/100-social-media-mobile-andinternet-statistics-for-2012/.
33 See, e.g., Susan Waters & James Ackerman, Exploring Privacy Management on
Facebook: Motivations and Perceived Consequences of Voluntary Disclosure, 17 J.
COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 101, 105 (2011).
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socially shared information has always left disclosers of information vulnerable
to privacy harms, until recently this threat was less than pervasive. Before
entrenchment of the social web, most social interaction was ephemeral, on
paper, or one-to-few. Facebook, YouTube, and the host of social media have
overseen an explosion of social data, which is increasingly absorbing the web
and complicating our online existence.
So who exactly are threats to social data? Maritza Johnson, Serge Egelman,
and Steven Bellovin have identified the most unwanted audiences viewing
social media disclosures as “future employers, supervisors, family members,
peers and subordinates,” and general “social threats” in addition to
“organizational threats” related to the collection and use of data from social
network sites.34
These relationships are different in important ways from users’
relationships with the social media company itself. The relationship between
social media users and the website itself regarding privacy is ostensibly
governed by, among other things, the website’s privacy policy.35 However, the
relationship between users and their peers is governed by a much more complex
and unstable set of norms, shared assumptions, informal terms, and a host of
other signals and cultural contexts.36 Consider the two major kinds of
individuals who have or want access to social data—insiders and outsiders—
and the related user vulnerabilities.

1. Insiders
The most proximate threats to social data are “insiders”—those selected to
be recipients of, or at least have access to, online disclosures. Our “friends,”
“followers,” and other networked connections are all in positions to misuse
social data immediately upon disclosure. Members of online social networks
have had information disclosed, presumably by insiders, to outsiders in harmful

34 Maritza Johnson et al., Facebook and Privacy: It’s Complicated, in PROCEEDINGS OF

8TH SYMPOSIUM ON USABLE PRIVACY AND SECURITY, at 2.1 (2012), available at
http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2012/proceedings/a9_Johnson.pdf (including in the “threats”
category people purposefully posting content to harm the individual and a general concern
over a lack of control over the actions of other users).
35 See Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1635
(2011); Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 587, 588 (2007).
36 See Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2014); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF.
L. REV. 1, 8 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88
WASH. L. REV. 385, 401 (2013); Woodrow Hartzog, The Problems and Promise with Terms
of Use as the Chaperone of the Social Web, CONCURRING OPINIONS (June 11, 2013, 1:09
AM),
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2013/06/the-problems-and-promisewith-terms-of-use-as-the-chaperone-of-the-social-web.html.
THE
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ways.37 In one instance, Facebook asked its users to report whether the user’s
“friends” were using their real name, a requirement under the website’s terms of
use.38
In some instances, even insiders who have been explicitly granted access to
social data are not the desired recipients. At first blush, it seems nonsensical to
suggest that users would like to hide self-disclosed information from those who
have been explicitly authorized by the user to view this same information. But
social interaction online is not so simple. Recall the University of Texas
students whose sexuality was revealed to their parents via their “friendship” on
Facebook.39 Also consider Facebook’s new “Graph Search” feature.40 Users
forget or do not always realize the true extent of their potential audience when
they post.41 Similar concerns are raised by the automatic, accidental, or forced
sharing of browsing and reading habits through “frictionless sharing.”42

37 See, e.g., FACEBOOK FIRED, supra note 14 (detailing reports of many social media
users disciplined for their posts, many of which were reported by the user’s social network
connections); Geoffrey Fowler, Three Facebook Privacy Loopholes, WALL ST. J. BLOG (Oct.
12, 2012, 10:33 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2012/10/12/three-facebook-privacyloopholes/?mod=WSJBlog; Will Oremus, Could Your Crummy Klout Score Keep You from
Getting a Job?, SLATE FUTURE TENSE (Oct. 3, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.slate.com/
blogs/future_tense/2012/10/03/online_privacy_can_employers_use_klout_scores_facebook_
profiles_to_screen_applicants_.html (“There are also plen[t]y of instances of workers being
fired for Facebook posts even if their employers don’t have access to their accounts.”).
38 Carl Franzen, Facebook Surveying Users About Their Friends’ Fake Usernames,
TALKING POINTS MEMO IDEALAB (Sept. 20, 2012, 6:12 PM), http://idealab.talkingpointsme
mo.com/2012/09/facebook-confirms-its-surveying-users-about-their-friends-fake-usernames.
php.
39 See Fowler, supra note 13.
40 Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Obscurity: A Better Way To Think About Your
Data than “Privacy,” ATLANTIC (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/
technology/archive/2013/01/obscurity-a-better-way-to-think-about-your-data-than-privacy/2
67283/.
41 Yang Wang et al., From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1307, 1313–18 (2013). This fact is often evident when employees are fired for
complaining about their jobs to their Facebook “friends,” at least one of whom was the
employee’s boss.
42 According to Neil Richards, “[u]nder a regime of ‘frictionless sharing,’ we don't
need to choose to share our activities online. Instead, everything we read or watch
automatically gets uploaded to our Facebook or Twitter feed.” Neil M. Richards, The Perils
of Social Reading, 101 GEO. L.J. 689, 691 (2013); see also id. at 713 (“There are just three
problems with making frictionless sharing of reader records our default: [f]rictionless
sharing isn’t frictionless, it isn’t really sharing, and it’s corrosive of intellectual privacy and
intellectual freedom.”); William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
(forthcoming 2013); Somini Sengupta, Private Posts on Facebook Revealed, N.Y. TIMES
BITS (Jan. 18, 2013, 6:52 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/01/18/private-posts-onfacebook-revealed/.
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2. Outsiders
Outsiders, conceptualized here as those without access to protected social
data, can serve as threats by both seeking access to social data and disclosing
one’s personal information online in social contexts in which that person is not
a part. One of the most significant drivers of social data protections is the threat
of outsiders seeking social data that is protected or otherwise hidden.43 There
have been numerous instances of employers asking for social media passwords
or access to social media.44 School administrators are often tempted to monitor
social media usage.45 Police officers46 and other entities have an interest in
accessing social data.47 Facebook’s targeted ad campaign can potentially be
used to determine whether some users are gay.48
43 Solove, supra note 14 (“I thought that the practice of demanding passwords was so

outrageous that it couldn’t be very common . . . . But . . . the practice is much more prevalent
than I had imagined, and it is an issue that has very important implications as we move more
of our personal data to the Cloud.”).
44 See, e.g., Joanna Stern, Demanding Facebook Passwords May Break Law, Say
Senators, ABC NEWS (Mar. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/facebook-pass
words-employers-schools-demand-access-facebook-senators/print?id=16005565.
45 See, e.g., John Browning, Universities Monitoring Social Media Accounts of StudentAthletes: A Recipe for Disaster, 75 TEX. BAR J. 840, 840 (2012), available at http://www.
texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Texas_Bar_Journal&Template=/CM/ContentDisp
lay.cfm&ContentID=20538; Sandra Engelland, Keller District Officials Look to Extra
Security, Monitoring Social Media To Prevent Pranks, KELLER CITIZEN (May 28, 2013),
http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/05/28/4888860/keller-district-officials-look.html;
Michael Hartwell, Schools Monitor Students’ Posts on Facebook, Twitter, SENTINEL &
ENTERPRISE (Jan. 14, 2013, 7:01 AM), http://www.sentinelandenterprise.com/topstory/ci_
22369565/schools-monitor-students-posts-facebook-twitter.
46 See, e.g., Benny Evangelista, Social Media Monitored More by Law Enforcement,
SFGATE (Aug. 13, 2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Social-mediamonitored-more-by-law-enforcement-2335017.php; Priya Kumar, Law Enforcement and
Mining Social Media: Where’s the Oversight?, INTERNET MONITOR (July 1, 2013),
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/internetmonitor/2013/07/01/law-enforcement-and-miningsocial-media-wheres-the-oversight/; Paul Wagenseil, British Cops Admit They Monitor
Facebook, Twitter, TECHNEWSDAILY (June 27, 2013, 5:42 PM), http://www.technewsdaily.
com/18448-socmint-police-monitoring.html.
47 See, e.g., Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST, June 6, 2013,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-06/news/39784046_1_prism-nsa-u-s-servers
(discussing leaked documents implying that the National Security Agency had direct access
to Facebook servers). But see Ted Ullyot, Facebook Releases Data, Including All National
Security Requests, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (June 14, 2013), http://newsroom.fb.com/News/
636/Facebook-Releases-Data-Including-All-National-Security-Requests (denying allegations
of direct server access, but disclosing that U.S. government entities requested Facebook data
between 9,000 and 10,000 times in the six months prior to December 31, 2012).
48 Adrian Chen, How Facebook’s Targeted Ads Revealed One User’s Sexuality,
GAWKER (Oct. 23, 2010, 12:57 PM), http://gawker.com/5671582/how-facebooks-targetedads-revealed-one-users-sexuality.
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Outsiders might also post information on the social web. For example, a
number of healthcare workers have been disciplined for publishing their
patients’ sensitive health-related information on social media.49 Police officers
and emergency responders have been disciplined for disclosing personal details
of those with whom they interact.50 Numerous websites and conversation
threads expose or shame customers and other people who violate social norms
such as tipping51 and proper dating etiquette.52 It should be noted, however, that
problems of outsiders posting personal information on the Internet are broader
than the narrower focus of insiders disclosing, and outsiders seeking, social
data. As such, these problems are beyond the scope of this Article.

B. The Haphazard Emerging Protection of Social Data
Although database protections have little effect on social data, the law does
provide some remedy for social data harms. But these remedies are either too
narrow in scope or too burdensome to be effective for most social data
problems. For example, the privacy torts ostensibly protect against the public
disclosure of private facts, intrusion upon seclusion, appropriation of one’s
name or likeness, and depiction of an individual in a false light—all potential

49 E.g., CNA Put Nasty Photo of Patient on Facebook, Officials Say, RTV6 (July 21,
2011), http://www.theindychannel.com/news/cna-put-nasty-photo-of-patient-on-facebookofficials-say; Molly Hennessy-Fiske, When Facebook Goes to the Hospital, Patients May
Suffer, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/08/local/la-me-face
book-20100809.
50 J. David Goodman & Wendy Ruderman, Police Dept. Sets Rules for Officers’ Use of
Social Media, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/nyregion/
new-york-police-dept-issues-guidelines-for-social-media.html?_r=0 (“Last year, one
Brooklyn precinct commander was criticized for posting photographs of men about to be
released from custody to a Twitter account maintained by the precinct.”); Candice M. Giove
& Brad Hamilton, FDNY EMS Workers Post Gory, Private Photos of Patients Online, N.Y.
POST, Mar. 31, 2013, http://nypost.com/2013/03/31/fdny-ems-workers-post-gory-privatephotos-of-patients-online/ (“[S]ome first responders can’t resist snapping shots of people
they’re supposed to be helping.”).
51 John Del Signore, Are You Named on This Website Outing Bad Tippers?,
GOTHAMIST (Apr. 29, 2011, 3:28 PM), http://gothamist.com/2011/04/29/are_you_named_on
_this_website_outin.php; LOUSYTIPPERS.COM, http://www.lousytippers.com/ (last visited
July 2, 2013); see also Neetzan Zimmerman, Pastor Who Left Sanctimonious Tip Gets
Waitress Fired from Applebee’s, Claims Her Reputation Was Ruined, GAWKER (Jan. 31,
2013, 1:03 PM), http://gawker.com/5980558/pastor-who-left-sanctimonious-tip-gets-wait
ress-fired-from-applebees-claims-her-reputation-was-ruined.
52 See Anna North, “Yelp for Guys” Founder Hopes It Makes Men Better, BUZZFEED
(Feb. 6, 2013, 3:08 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/annanorth/yelp-for-guys-founder-hopesit-makes-men-better (“Lulu lets women (and only women) create ‘reviews’ of men they
know.”); REPORT YOUR EX, http://reportyourex.com/ (last visited July 2, 2013); see also
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 50–53 (2007).
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harms enabled by social data.53 Yet the First Amendment’s broad exclusions for
“newsworthy” and “public” information mean that the torts are not very
effective online.54
In light of this failure, the government and private organizations might seek
to protect users of social technologies. State legislatures have sought to limit
employer and educator access to social data.55 Organizations and entire
industries have begun to promulgate social media guidelines.56 But what should
guide them other than an instinctual sense that not all information disclosed via
social media should be free for everyone to use? There is no common guidance
for the emerging peer-focused privacy protections.
For example, at the time this Article was written at least eleven states have
planned to consider whether to regulate employer and school administrator
access to the personal social media accounts of employees, job applicants, and
students.57 Maryland, Illinois, Delaware, California, New Jersey, Michigan, and
Utah have already enacted measures that limit employer or school administrator
access to social media accounts.58 Some critics contend that such laws vastly
53 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A–652E (1977).
54 See Roberts v. CareFlite, No. 02–12–00105–CV, 2012 WL 4662962, at *4 (Tex. Ct.

App. Oct. 4, 2012); Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 357, 361 (2011) (“[T]he First Amendment should trump disclosure privacy in all
but a narrow category of cases.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Slow Demise of Defamation and the
Privacy Torts, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 11, 2010, 4:52 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
daniel-j-solove/the-slow-demise-of-defama_b_758570.html.
55 See, e.g., David L. Hudson, Jr., Site Unseen: Schools, Bosses Barred from Eyeing
Students’, Workers’ Social Media, ABA JOURNAL (Nov. 1, 2012, 3:10 AM), http://www.aba
journal.com/magazine/article/site_unseen_schools_bosses_barred_from_eyeing_students_w
orkers_social_media; Solove, supra note 14.
56 See, e.g., Angela Haggerty, CPS Publishes Social Media Crime Guidelines for
Prosecutors as Police Are Deluged with Complaints, DRUM (June 20, 2013, 12:07 PM),
http://www.thedrum.com/news/2013/06/20/cps-publishes-social-media-crime-guidelinesprosecutors-police-are-deluged#OrHeOT1pVztIZsuW.99; Theresa Lee & Brian Wong, Safe
Tweeting: SEC Provides Guidance on Social Media and Regulation FD Compliance,
JDSUPRA L. NEWS (Apr. 11, 2013), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/safe-tweeting-secprovides-guidance-on-70644/; Sarah Peters, Lopatcong Township Council Adopts Social
Media Policies Prior to Launching Facebook, Twitter Accounts, LEHIGHVALLEYLIVE.COM
(June 14, 2013, 5:30 AM), http://www.lehighvalleylive.com/phillipsburg/index.ssf/2013/06/
lopatcong_township_council_ado.html; David Sims, Social Media Policies Present
Challenges to Business, IMT (June 18, 2013), http://news.thomasnet.com/IMT/2013/06/18/
social-media-policies-present-challenges-to-business/.
57 ABA Section of Labor & Emp’t Law Emp’t Rights & Responsibilities Comm., A
Survey of State Laws Relating to Social Networking Privacy and Other Recent
Developments in Workplace Privacy Law 3–4, 7, 9–11, 13–16 (presented at the Midwinter
Meeting, Mar. 19–23, 2013), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/labor_law/2013/03/employment_rightsresponsibilitiescommitteemidwintermeeting/2
6_developments.authcheckdam.pdf.
58 MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-712 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 55/10 (2012); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 8101–8105 (Supp. 2012); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§ 99120–99122 (West Supp. 2013); CAL. LAB. CODE § 980 (West Supp. 2013); N.J. STAT.
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and unnecessarily expand previously existing privacy protections in the United
States in addition to creating an inconsistent patchwork of statutes.59
Professor Eric Goldman has noted two problems with California’s attempt
to protect social data from employers: 1) the law is too broad because “social
media” is too difficult to define; and 2) the law falsely assumed a bright-line
dichotomy between “personal” and “non-personal” accounts.60 Phillip L.
Gordon, Amber M. Spataro, and William J. Simmons noted that:
[t]hese laws, however, do not follow a model with identical or nearly identical
terms. Instead, they create a complex patchwork that makes it virtually
impossible for a multi-state employer to establish a uniform policy: [e]ach state
uses its own key terms (some of which are defined, some of which are not);
[e]ach state defines its own scope of coverage (some as narrow as prohibiting
only seeking login information from applicants, some as broad as prohibiting
employers from requiring employees to disclose any internet content to their
employers); and [e]ach state defines its own remedial scheme (some silent on
remedies, some providing for a private right of action, and some requiring
administrative enforcement).61

The inconsistencies between these laws make clear the need to articulate a
set of commonly held values to guide policy and self-regulatory efforts.

III. PRINCIPLES FOR THE PROTECTION OF SOCIAL DATA
Accepted principles could provide some consistency in regulatory, selfregulatory, and design efforts. Legislators, policymakers, courts, companies,
and advocates need a common language to better articulate and properly
constrain unique rules or restrictions for social data, as well as to better locate

ANN. §§ 18A:3-29 to 3-32 (West Supp. 2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.273–37.275 (Supp.
2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-48-201 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013).
59 See, e.g., PHILLIP L. GORDON ET AL., SOCIAL MEDIA PASSWORD PROTECTION AND
PRIVACY—THE PATCHWORK OF STATE LAWS AND HOW IT AFFECTS EMPLOYERS 5 (2013),
available at http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/LittlerReportSocialMediaPasswordProtect
ionaAndPrivacyThePatchworkOfStateLawsAndHowItAffectsEmployers.pdf (“These laws,
however, do not follow a model with identical or nearly identical terms. Instead, they create
a complex patchwork that makes it virtually impossible for a multi-state employer to
establish a uniform policy.”).
60 Goldman, supra note 2; see also Venkat Balasubramani, Recap of Washington
State’s Employer Social Media Password Bill, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (May 3, 2013, 10:49 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/05/recap_of_wa
shin.htm (predicting that a new bill will cause more problems than it solves); Venkat
Balasubramani, Washington State’s Proposed Employer Social Media Law: The Legislature
Should Take a Cautious Approach—SB 5211, ERIC GOLDMAN TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG
(Feb. 9, 2013, 8:25 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2013/02/washingtons_pro.
htm (criticizing new law for lack of clarity in defining social media).
61 GORDON ET AL., supra note 59, at 5.
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existing, perhaps more broadly applicable rules that might also apply to social
data.
A few have already attempted to create guidelines for social data under
different names, most notably the Social Network Constitution,62 Social
Network Users Bill of Rights,63 and A Bill of Privacy Rights for Social Network
Users.64 These are either over-inclusive for the purpose of social data guidance
because they focus on databases and commercial use of information in addition
to social harms, or are not quite specific enough to use as a true guide in
crafting rules for social data.
A truly effective set of principles would unite social data issues to serve as a
complementary addition to, rather than replacement of, the FIPPs. The
principles must be flexible enough to apply across many different social
contexts and reach the behavior of both insiders and outsiders, while also
providing enough substance to serve as a meaningful lodestar for legislators,
judges, administrators, companies, designers, and law enforcement officials. In
order to be this flexible, the principles should not specifically address
organizational-specific concerns, such as serving especially vulnerable
populations or hosting abnormally sensitive information, which might require
more robust and specific regulations.65
So what is important to users on the social web? Culling from existing laws,
relevant literature, and current disputes, it appears that the three most important
privacy-related concepts are boundaries, identity, and network integrity. Using
the language of mandated principles similar to the FIPPs, this essay proposes
that these three concepts can serve as the basis of the social data principles.

62 Lori Andrews, The Social Network Constitution, SOCIAL NETWORK CONSTITUTION,
http://www.socialnetworkconstitution.com/the-social-network-constitution.html (last visited
June 12, 2013).
63 Alison Diana, Social Networking Bill of Rights Released, INFO. WEEK SECURITY
(June 23, 2010, 11:51 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/security/privacy/socialnetworking-bill-of-rights-release/225701171.
64 Kurt Opsahl, A Bill of Privacy Rights for Social Network Users, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (May 19, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/05/bill-privacyrights-social-network-users.
65 For an example of sector specific guidelines, the SEC recently released its 2013
guidance on the use of social media by publicly traded corporations under Regulation FD.
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(a) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934: NETFLIX, INC., AND REED HASTINGS, EXCHANGE ACT
RELEASE NO. 69279, at 2 (Apr. 2, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/invest
report/34-69279.pdf; see also Mark T. Plitcha et al., SEC’s Netflix Report Confirms Ability
To Use Social Media for Reg. FD Disclosures but Cites Risks, MARTINDALE (Apr. 9, 2013),
http://www.martindale.com/corporate-law/article_Foley-Lardner-LLP_1748682.htm (giving
a background and summary of SEC guidance).
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A. Those Interacting with Social Data Should Respect an Individual’s
Expressed Boundaries
One of the most important and relevant conceptualizations of privacy in
social interactions is social psychologist Irwin Altman’s theory of privacy as a
process of boundary regulation.66 Specifically, Altman conceives of privacy as
“selective control of access to the self” and draws heavily from contextual
settings.67 Altman theorizes that privacy has five properties:
1) Privacy involves a mental process whereby we change how open or closed
we are in response to changes in our internal states and external conditions.
2) There is a difference between actual and desired levels of privacy.
3) Privacy is a non-monotonic function, with an optimal level of privacy and
the possibility of too much privacy.
4) Privacy is bi-directional, involving inputs from others (e.g. noise) and
outputs to others (e.g. oral communications).
5) Privacy applies at the individual and group levels of analysis.68

The model specified by Altman envisions privacy as an ongoing, discursive,
optimizing process.69 As individuals move through contexts, they perceive
stimuli (noise, light, communication). Based on the individual’s goals in the
context, boundaries of communication are opened (e.g. disclosing to a new
acquaintance) or closed (e.g. withdrawing from a noisy cocktail party) in
relation to the stimuli. Because privacy is a vague and evolving concept,
Altman specifies that individuals continually manage their boundaries in order
to optimize their privacy or disclosure goals.70
Boundary regulation theory is an ideal and developed theory of privacy for
social data because it is built around the need for Internet users to disclose
personal information to some, but not all. Two theories influenced by Altman’s
theory of privacy regulation are Sandra Petronio’s Communications Privacy

66 IRWIN ALTMAN, THE ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: PRIVACY, PERSONAL
SPACE, TERRITORY, CROWDING 27 (1975); Woodrow Hartzog, The Privacy Box: A Software
Proposal, 14 FIRST MONDAY (Nov. 2, 2009), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/
view/2682/2361.
67 ALTMAN, supra note 66, at 18; see also HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT
186 (2010).
68 Hartzog, supra note 66 (citing ALTMAN, supra note 66); see also Stephen T.
Margulis, On the Status and Contribution of Westin’s and Altman’s Theories of Privacy, 59
J. SOC. ISSUES 411, 412 (2003).
69 See Fred Stutzman & Woodrow Hartzog, Boundary Regulation in Social Media, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2012 CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE
WORK 769, 771 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1566904.
70 Id.
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Management Theory71 and Derlega and Chaikin’s Dual Boundary Concept.72
These theories focus on the communication between the provider and recipient
of information, exploring the process by which provider and recipient of
information negotiate the boundaries of the disclosure. Leysia Palen and Paul
Dourish apply Altman’s privacy regulation theory to social media
environments, concluding that “privacy management is a dynamic response to
circumstance rather than a static enforcement of rules; that it is defined by a set
of tensions between competing needs; and that technology can have many
impacts, by way of disrupting boundaries, spanning them, establishing new
ones, etc.”73 The management of privacy in social media requires an ongoing
awareness of both the social context and the ever-changing affordances of the
sites.
Boundaries are necessary for effective socialization both online and offline.
Boundaries that are too broad lead to social crowding and chilling effects,
whereas boundaries that are too narrow can lead to isolation. Wisniewski et al.
note that in the physical world, “crime, juvenile delinquency, homicide, and
civil strife have all been related to social crowding and high population
density.”74 In other research the authors note that “[b]oundaries are important
because they help us define self, give us protection (physically and
emotionally), help us manage our personal resources, and forge deeper
relationships.”75 Given the importance of personal boundaries and the limited
ability of people to control information post-disclosure, social data principles
should seek to minimize the intentional violation of boundaries.76
Many boundaries are virtually impossible to express or recognize, and, as
such, should not be a primary focus of those seeking to respect boundary
regulation. Only those boundaries that are or should be recognized by the social
data recipient should guide these principles. Social data boundaries can be
established implicitly and explicitly. Implicit boundaries may be constructed
71 See SANDRA PETRONIO, BOUNDARIES OF PRIVACY, at xvii (2002).
72 See generally Valerian J. Derlega & Alan L. Chaikin, Privacy and Self-Disclosure in

Social Relationships, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 102 (1977).
73 Leysia Palen & Paul Dourish, Unpacking “Privacy” for a Networked World, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING
SYSTEMS 129, 135 (2003), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jse
ssionid=0064B56D05CEF59AA66EE48001C204C8?doi=10.1.1.117.7183&rep=rep1&type
=pdf (discussing the tensions between privacy and publicity).
74 Pamela J. Wisniewski, Heather Richter Lipford & David C. Wilson, Fighting for My
Space: Coping Mechanisms for SNS Boundary Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 609, 610 (2012), available at
dl.acm.org/ft_gateway.cfm?ftid=1216916&id=2207761.
75 Pamela Karr-Wisniewski et al., A New Social Order: Mechanisms for Social Network
Site Boundary Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMCIS 1 (2011), available at
http://aisel.aisnet.org/amcis2011_submissions/101.
76 Lampinen, supra note 28, at 343 (“As boyd has stated, in a social network site,
privacy is a function of one’s disclosures, and the disclosures about one’s self by others in
the site. No one can fully control the content concerning him/herself that is being shared.”).
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through action, such as the creation of speech codes that signify in-group
memberships. Alternately, explicit boundaries may be established with privacy
settings, friending practices, or by obfuscating identifiers.77 There seem to be
three distinct boundaries relevant for those interacting with social data:
relational, contextual, and temporal. These boundaries can be violated with
respect to social data by posting the information of others on social media as
well as sharing another’s self-disclosed social data with unauthorized
individuals.

1. Rational Boundaries
One of the most fundamental boundaries set by social data users is within
relationships. When users disclose information to someone, they often do not
want that person to tell anyone else.78 Relational boundaries are the foundation
for numerous privacy laws, such as HIPAA,79 as well as the doctrine of
confidentiality, which is one of the oldest and most fundamental concepts
within privacy law.80
There are numerous relatively recent examples of people who seek or are
exposed to social data failing to respect relational boundaries. One of the most
obvious examples is the odious practice of non-consensual pornography,
sometimes called “revenge porn,” which is sometimes shared via social
technologies.81 In many contexts, this would seem to be a brazen breach of
confidentiality and, consequently, a violation of social data boundaries.82
Other kinds of boundaries, such as those established via technology, are
also routinely violated. For example, countless employees have been fired after
content protected by privacy settings has been disclosed by indiscreet
“friends.”83
77 See Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 69, at 773.
78 NISSENBAUM, supra note 67, at 84–88; Lauren Gelman, Privacy, Free Speech, and

“Blurry-Edged” Social Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1315, 1317 (2009); see also Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 919–20 (2005).
79 See Woodrow Hartzog, Chain-Link Confidentiality, 46 GA. L. REV. 657, 676–79
(2012); Peter A. Winn, Confidentiality in Cyberspace: The HIPAA Privacy Rules and the
Common Law, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 617, 619 (2002).
80 See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 123–26 (2007); Hartzog, Reviving Implied
Confidentiality, supra note 36.
81 See, e.g., Hartzog, Reviving Implied Confidentiality, supra note 36; Woodrow
Hartzog, How To Fight Revenge Porn, ATLANTIC (May 10, 2013, 1:42 PM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/how-to-fight-revenge-porn/275759/;
Anita Ramasastry, Revenge Porn Returns, with Home Addresses: Why the Site Is Legal and
What Legislators Might Do To Fix That, VERDICT (Jan. 15, 2013),
http://verdict.justia.com/2013/01/15/revenge-porn-returns-with-home-addresses.
82 See Hartzog, supra note 81.
83 See FACEBOOK FIRED, supra note 14 (aggregating links to stories about employees
fired as a result of postings made on Facebook and other social media).
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But perhaps most emblematic of attempts to violate relational boundaries is
the growing trend of employers and educators requesting access to a social
media user’s account.84 Not only are these employers attempting to violate
technologically, legally, and normatively defined boundaries established by the
user, but they are also attempting to violate the boundaries that have been set by
the user’s other networked connections. A fair assumption regarding the
acceptance of a friendship request is that such an action only gives the identified
user permission to view a friend’s newly accessible profile information,
particularly in light of many websites’ terms of use agreements.85

2. Contextual Boundaries
Social media users also rely on contextual protections to establish
boundaries, such as access controls, a limited ability to search, pseudonymity,
and other obfuscating techniques to lower the likelihood that information will
be found or understood.86 In previous research, Frederic Stutzman and I have
referred to the hidden context of this information as obscurity.87 We stated:
“[I]nformation is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these
factors: (1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4)
clarity.”88 Research has demonstrated that individuals rely almost reflexively on
the obscurity created by diminishing these factors in social data.89

84 See Solove, supra note 14 (“I thought that the practice of demanding
passwords . . . was a fringe practice done by a few small companies without much awareness
of privacy law. But . . . an attorney who has focused extensively on the issue, opened my
eyes to the fact that the practice is much more prevalent than I had imagined . . . .”).
85 See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The Problems with Requesting Access to Online
Communities, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Mar. 9, 2011, 9:08 AM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2011/03/problems-requesting-access-online-communities
(“By asking for access to profiles, usernames, and passwords, employers and administrators
aren’t just asking for specific information, they are stepping into the shoes of an individual
and seeing everything that individual has been authorized to see. That authorization was
likely obtained through numerous negotiations (i.e. ‘friend requests’) whereby users rely on
the representation that their ‘friends’ are who they say they are. . . . It is probably reasonable
to assume that most Facebook users aren’t contemplating a state government accessing their
profile when they accept another’s friend request.”).
86 See, e.g., Hartzog & Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, supra note 36, at 8;
Hartzog & Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, supra note 36, at 387; Stutzman & Hartzog,
supra note 69; danah boyd, Social Steganography: Learning To Hide in Plain Sight,
ZEPHORIA (Aug. 23, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/08/23/socialsteganography-learning-to-hide-in-plain-sight.html; see also Gelman, supra note 78, at 1317.
87 Hartzog & Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, supra note 36; Hartzog &
Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, supra note 36.
88 Hartzog & Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, supra note 36, at 4.
89 Id. at 2 n.1.
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Obscurity is the result of contextual boundaries that can effectively hide
social data and, as a result, keep it safe.90 Those who use pseudonyms to check
into locations using FourSquare worry less about strangers knowing their
location.91 The feeds of Twitter users with protected accounts are less likely to
be scrutinized by potential employers than those with public accounts.92
Consider the previously discussed incident with Bobbi Duncan and Taylor
McCormick, in which the contextual boundary of membership in a particular
group was violated when assumptions about context were incongruous with the
actual visibility setting of the group.93
Many who interact with social data respect contextual boundaries.94 For
example, Legistorm, a website which monitors deleted tweets from politicians,
has gone on the record as saying it respects users’ privacy settings.95 Because
some kind of access restriction is used by most social media users in an
observable way, these restrictions should be respected by those dealing with
social data.96
Even insiders granted access to social data can now threaten contextual
boundaries, as Facebook’s Graph Search feature allows users to search for
information that previously was protected by the high transactional cost of

90 Hartzog & Selinger, supra note 40; NISSENBAUM, supra note 67, at 69–71; Finn
Brunton & Helen Nissenbaum, Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and Analysis: A
Political Theory of Obfuscation, 16 FIRST MONDAY (May 2, 2011), http://firstmonday.org/
ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3493.
91 See, e.g., Steven Musil, Foursquare To Show Users’ Full Names, Share More Data,
CNET (Dec. 30, 2012, 9:29 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-57561271-93/four
square-to-show-users-full-names-share-more-data/.
92 The Library of Congress did not include protected accounts in its archive of all
public Twitter accounts in 2010. See Matt Raymond, The Library and Twitter: An FAQ,
LIBR. CONGRESS BLOG (Apr. 28, 2010), http://blogs.loc.gov/loc/2010/04/the-library-andtwitter-an-faq/ (“Twitter’s gift . . . to the Library of Congress of its entire archive of public
tweets, announced two weeks ago today, sure has stoked the public’s interest.” (emphasis
added)).
93 Fowler, supra note 13.
94 See generally NISSENBAUM, supra note 67.
95 See Kashmir Hill, Congressional Staffers Upset that People Actually Want To Read
Their Tweets, FORBES (Apr. 5, 2013, 2:17 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/
2013/04/05/congressional-staffers-upset-that-people-actually-want-to-read-their-tweets/.
96 See MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND
PRIVACY 2 (2013), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2013/
PIP_TeensSocialMediaandPrivacy.pdf (“60% of teen Facebook users keep their profiles
private, and most report high levels of confidence in their ability to manage their settings.”);
MARY MADDEN & AARON SMITH, PEW RESEARCH CTR., REPUTATION MANAGEMENT AND
SOCIAL MEDIA 2 (2010), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/
2010/PIP_Reputation_Management_with_topline.pdf (“71% of social networking users ages
18–29 have changed the privacy settings on their profile to limit what they share with others
online.”).
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visiting each profile separately to find information or by accidental (and thus
less likely) discovery.97

3. Temporal Boundaries
Boundaries can also be established by the passage of time. Many kinds of
social data are created for present purposes and cease to maintain this social
utility once communicated, though in the world of big data, these
communications might have latent value.98 Consider one’s Facebook status
update announcing a job promotion or an inside joke shared with a friend on
Twitter. It is unlikely the discloser and recipient will revisit those posts often (or
at all) after their creation. Indeed, when Facebook first started randomly
highlighting old posts, users had a negative reaction as though the past were
coming back to haunt them.99 Over time, old social data rots, gets deleted, and
becomes less relevant.
The increased obscurity in this data can also serve as a kind of temporal
boundary, albeit a very hazy one. After a certain amount of time, it’s
normatively questionable to publicize certain kinds of social data in the same
way it might violate a norm for an ex-boyfriend to recount word for word an
entire fight he had with his former partner ten years ago. The value of temporal
boundaries was made clear in the public outcry over the Library of Congress’s
archiving of all public Twitter streams.100
Temporal boundaries are an important impetus for some versions of the
“right to be forgotten” proposed in the EU and elsewhere, as well as an
unresolved tension in the privacy torts between the right to free speech and the
need for individuals to be able to put the past behind them.101 It might be
97 See Kashmir Hill, How To Use “Graph Search” To Facebook-Stalk Mark
Zuckerberg and His Employees, FORBES (Jan. 15, 2013, 6:51 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/kashmirhill/2013/01/15/how-to-use-graph-search-to-facebook-stalk-mark-zuckerberg/;
see also Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1617–18 (2007).
98 See generally MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 3.
99 See Mike Melanson, Dislike Facebook’s “Memorable Status Updates”?: There’s a
Group for That, READWRITE (Apr. 6, 2011), http://readwrite.com/2011/04/06/dislike_face
books_memorable_status_updates_theres#awesm=~ofb69lLReIdiWT (“Earlier this year,
Facebook began testing a feature called ‘Memorable Stories,’ which showed users a randomseeming selection of old status updates in the site’s sidebar. Within days, users began
complaining that the feature showed status updates that they didn't want to be reminded of
or, even worse, that deleted status updates were showing up.”).
100 See, e.g., Karl Bode, Library of Congress Responds to Privacy Gripes by Making
Twitter Archive Less Useful, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2010, 2:17 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/
articles/20100503/1024339281.shtml (“Late last week a little more detail of the archiving
process leaked out, the LOC saying that in response to privacy complaints they wouldn’t
store deleted tweets, and they’d also be placing all tweets under embargo for a period of six
months . . . .”).
101 See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 808–09 (2d Cir. 1940); Melvin v.
Reid, 297 P. 91, 92–93 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
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perilous to attempt to legally enforce temporal boundaries with any rigidity.
Any attempt to define a temporal boundary risks being arbitrary. There is very
little research to guide in the creation of determinate temporal boundaries. Yet,
it appears that temporal boundaries are respected and even promoted in some
contexts by those interacting with or mediating social data. For example,
services that have an “exploding” feature like the popular mobile application
Snapchat, which makes photos invisible after a preset time limit, inherently
demonstrate that disclosures lose their primary utility as social data as time
passes, even if they simultaneously gain value in a big data context.102
Relational, contextual, and temporal boundaries often overlap, which
should be recognized by those seeking to implement the social data principles.
There are many different ways the boundary regulation principle could be
implemented in the law and respected by companies and others interacting with
social data. Here are three potential rules in the spirit of the boundary regulation
principle:
1) There should be no coercive requests or attempts to access bound social
data absent apparent permission.
2) Sensitive and confidential social data should not be disclosed outside of
the boundaries in which it exists without authorization.
3) Bound social data should be left generally as obscure as it was found.103

B. Those Interacting with Social Data Should Respect the Integrity of the
Individual’s Expressed Identity
Identity is a central concept in social data. Erving Goffman and others have
observed that identity is performative.104 If so, there are few better stages than
social media. Users craft profiles, avatars, comments, and pictures to convey
“front-stage” signals—those they intend their observers to draw upon as they
make sense of their information and actions.105 In previous work, Frederic
Stutzman and I have argued that “[a]ccording to Goffman, our ability to ‘read’ a
scene, and thus appropriately judge how we present ourselves, is a critical
component in social interaction. We utilize a range of cues and physical
structures to figure out how we should present ourselves.”106 With regard to
social data:
On the social web, where content is peer-produced in a social milieu, new
challenges of identity management have emerged. On social network sites,
102 Of course, this essay has argued that big data presents related but distinct privacyrelated issues.
103 See Hartzog & Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, supra note 36, at 2.
104 GOFFMAN, supra note 23, at 22–30.
105 Id.
106 Hartzog & Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, supra note 36, at 7 (citing
ERVING GOFFMAN, BEHAVIOR IN PUBLIC PLACES 151–65 (1963)).
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where the articulation of the social network is a key feature, identification can
occur through both direct and indirect disclosures. For example, an individual
that maintains a pseudonymous profile may become publicly identifiable based
on whom the individual connects to, or what a friend writes on the individual’s
wall. Therefore, the intention of the individual in protecting her or his identity
extends beyond self-disclosure—to the management of disclosures about the
individual and to the selective crafting of the online persona.107

danah boyd and Nicole Ellison have noted that social network sites
“constitute an important research context for scholars investigating processes of
impression management, self-presentation, and friendship performance.”108
Social data is used in many different ways across various platforms to create
and manage identity.109
Disputes over identity and social data make clear the value that people place
on the integrity of their identity. For example, the so-called “nymwars”
involved social media restrictions on the use of pseudonyms and the mandate
that users use their real names.110 While the use of real names can help verify
identity and increase user trust in the network, the inability to disguise oneself
or create new identities limits the utility of social media and restricts the way in
107 Id. at 38.
108 boyd & Ellison, supra note 2, at 219; see also id. at 221 (“Given that [social network

sites] enable individuals to connect with one another, it is not surprising that they have
become deeply embedded in user[s’] lives.”).
109 See, e.g., John A. Bargh et al., Can You See the Real Me? Activation and Expression
of the “True Self” on the Internet, 58 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 44–45 (2002); danah boyd, Why
Youth (Heart) Social Network Sites: The Role of Networked Publics in Teenage Social Life,
in YOUTH, IDENTITY, AND DIGITAL MEDIA 119, 133 (David Buckingham ed., 2008),
available at http://mitpress.mit.edu/sites/default/files/titles/free_download/9780262524834_
Youth_Identity_and_Digital_Media.pdf; Houn-Gee Chen et al., Online Privacy Control via
Anonymity and Pseudonym: Cross-cultural Implications, 27 BEHAVIOUR & INFO. TECH. 229
(2008); Joan Morris DiMicco & David R. Millen, Identity Management: Multiple
Presentations of Self in Facebook, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2007 CONFERENCE ON
SUPPORTING GROUP WORK 383, 383–86, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=
1316682; Airi Lampinen et al., We’re in It Together: Interpersonal Management of
Disclosure in Social Network Services, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 3217, 3217 (2011), available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1979420; Airi Lampinen, Sakari Tamminen & Antti
Oulasvirta, “All My People Right Here, Right Now”: Management of Group Co-presence on
a Social Networking Site, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ACM 2007 CONFERENCE ON SUPPORTING
GROUP WORK 281 (2009), available at http://www.mpi-inf.mpg.de/~oantti/pubs/fp158lampinen.pdf. Identity has been theorized as a central aspect of privacy as well. See, e.g.,
Jonathan Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33 SETON HALL L.
REV. 371, 371–72 (2003).
110 See Nymwars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nymwars (last visited July 2,
2013); see also danah boyd, “Real Names” Policies Are an Abuse of Power, APOPHENIA
(Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2011/08/04/real-names.html;
Jillian C. York, A Case for Pseudonyms, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (July 29, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/07/case-pseudonyms.
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which individuals choose to identify themselves. This interest has even been
recognized by some regulators, like those in Germany, who have ordered
Facebook to stop enforcing its real name policy.111
A related threat to the identity integrity principle is the inability to parse
one’s identity for diverse audiences. In previous research, Frederic Stutzman
and I observed that, because individuals do not have a singular concept of
identity, they often wish to bifurcate their online identity by creating two
separate profiles within the same or similar media.112 This practice preserves
the integrity of our complex and often conflicting notions of identity by delinking certain kinds of personal information from others. For example, I might
like to have separate personal and professional social media accounts so that I
can effortlessly share photos of me and my son dressed up as a wizard for
Halloween with my personal friends and my latest publications and legal news
with professional friends.
This separation is desirable not necessarily because my personal photos are
private in the traditional sense of the term, but, rather, I do not wish for every
aspect of my identity to be equally revealed to my friends from various different
parts of my life. Such separations are seen by many organizations as wise. For
example, the American Medical Association recommends separate professional
and personal accounts on Facebook.113 Yet multiple profiles are prohibited by
some social network websites, including Facebook, and without the ability to
cleanly manage two profiles, audience segmentation can be a cumbersome,
confusing, and time consuming process.
The identity integrity principle can also be violated by those who usurp a
user’s identity in unacceptable ways. The most obvious example is imposters,
an increasing problem for social media users that has been met with robust
legislation prohibiting the practice.114 Yet employers and other organizations
111 See Loek Essers, German Privacy Regulator Orders Facebook To End Its Real Name
Policy, IT WORLD (Dec. 17, 2012, 11:00 AM), http://www.itworld.com/security/328387/
german-privacy-regulator-orders-facebook-end-its-real-name-policy.
112 Stutzman & Hartzog, supra note 69, at 776.
113 See Nicolas P. Terry, Fear of Facebook: Private Ordering of Social Media Risks
Incurred by Healthcare Providers, 90 NEB. L. REV. 703, 713–14 (2012) (“The substantive
provisions of the AMA policy relate to the privacy and confidentiality of identifiable patient
data, the utilization of privacy and security settings combined with the obligation to selfaudit, and the maintenance of appropriate boundaries with patients, preferably by separating
the personal from the professional.”).
114 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.790 (West Supp. 2013) (“A person may be
liable in a civil action based on a claim of invasion of privacy when: (a) The person
impersonates another actual person on a social networking web site or online bulletin
board . . . .”); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 33.07 (West Supp. 2012) (“A person commits an
offense if the person, without obtaining the other person’s consent and with the intent to
harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona of another
person to: (1) create a web page on a commercial social networking site or other Internet
website; or (2) post or send one or more messages on or through a commercial social
networking site or other Internet website, other than on or through an electronic mail
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also risk violating the identity integrity principle when they seek to restrict not
only the professionally related activity of its agents, but also an agent’s personal
activity.115
Impersonation can create three distinct but related problems. First, the
person who is being impersonated is harmed by having her identity
compromised. Second, those interacting with an imposter risk being defrauded.
Finally, impersonation can corrupt the integrity of an expressed social network
by rendering the connections suspect and making reliance on the network
dubious.
There are at least four different guidelines that can effectuate the identity
integrity principle, though it is important to note that their relative desirability is
entirely dependent upon the desired utility and context of the social data:
1) Restrictions on the use of pseudonyms and other identity-masking
techniques should be minimized.
2) Restrictions on the use of multiple profiles and other non-deceptive
audience segmentation techniques should be minimized.
3) Individuals should not be impersonated.116
4) There should be no undue influence exerted over an individual’s online
identity.
Note that the identity integrity principle is also reflected in a number of
existing laws including the right of publicity and the myriad of laws prohibiting
identity theft.117 A possible tension can exist between the identity integrity
principle, which seeks autonomy for individuals by allowing pseudonyms, with

program or message board program. (b) A person commits an offense if the person sends an
electronic mail, instant message, text message, or similar communication that references a
name, domain address, phone number, or other item of identifying information belonging to
any person: (1) without obtaining the other person's consent . . . .”).
115 For examples, see Chris Boudreaux, Policy Database, SOC. MEDIA GOVERNANCE,
http://socialmediagovernance.com/policies.php (last visited July 2, 2013).
116 Obvious parody accounts, such as those that frequently appear on Twitter, would not
fall into this restriction, since they would not be deceiving. See Parody, Commentary, and
Fan Account Policy, TWITTER, https://support.twitter.com/articles/106373-parodycommentary-and-fan-accounts-policy (last visited July 2, 2013) (“Twitter users are allowed
to create parody, commentary, or fan accounts (including role-playing) . . . . In order to
avoid impersonation, an account’s profile information should make it clear that the creator of
the account is not actually the same person or entity as the subject of the
parody/commentary.”).
117 See, e.g., Venkat Balasubramani, Logging into Someone Else’s Facebook Account
and Posting Messages on Their Friends’ Walls Could Be Identity Theft—In re Rolando S.,
TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Aug. 1, 2011, 3:06 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/ar
chives/2011/08/california_appe.htm; Daniel Solove, Facebook and the Appropriation of
Name or Likeness Tort, CONCURRING OPINIONS (Nov. 12, 2007, 12:27 AM), http://www.con
curringopinions.com/archives/2007/11/facebook_and_th.html.

2013]

SOCIAL DATA

1021

the final social data guideline, the network integrity principle, which seeks to
foster and protect the trust that is established in a network.

C. Those Interacting with Social Data Should Respect the Integrity of an
Expressed Network
The final defining characteristic of social data is the networked
connection.118 These connections can form “networked publics” with great
social utility as a place to exchange opinions and useful information, provide
and receive emotional support, develop a sense of self, and learn about social
norms and interaction.119 The network integrity principle is less concerned with
individual harm and more concerned with protecting the trust, utility, and, if
applicable, purpose of an expressed network.
There are numerous examples that demonstrate the interest in preserving
network integrity. One of the most prominent recent examples is the trend of
“catfishing,” which one court has defined as “[t]he phenomenon of internet
predators that fabricate online identities and entire social circles to trick people
into emotional/romantic relationships (over a long period of time).”120 In
addition to direct harm of fraud upon the victims (a violation of the identity
integrity principle), a high prevalence of imposters in a network would likely
render it unreliable for many purposes.
In some networks, misrepresented identities are acceptable because
pseudonyms and anonymity are the norm. However, the desire for
pseudonymity is problematic when the network is designed (or mandates) “real”
identities, such as with Facebook and online dating websites. For example,
plaintiffs brought a lawsuit against dating website Match.com alleging, among
other things, breach of contract for failing to review user profiles, failing to
purge inactive profiles, falsely labeling inactive profiles as “active,” failing to
protect the site against scammers, and failing to verify the identities of its

118 See, e.g., boyd & Ellison, supra note 2, at 211 (“What makes social network sites

unique is not that they allow individuals to meet strangers, but rather that they enable users
to articulate and make visible their social networks.”).
119 See, e.g., boyd, supra note 109, at 133; danah michele boyd, Friendster and Publicly
Articulated Social Networking, in Proceedings of the ACM 2004 Conference on Human
Factors in Computing Systems 1279, 1279–82 (2004), available at http://www.danah.org/
papers/CHI2004Friendster.pdf.
120 Zimmerman v. Bd. of Trs. of Ball State Univ., No. 1:12–cv–01475–JMS–DML,
2013 WL 1619532, at *13 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 15, 2013); see also Venkat Balasubramani,
Misguided Catfishing Scheme Leads to Discipline of College Students—Zimmerman v. Ball
State, TECH. & MARKETING L. BLOG (Apr. 24, 2013, 10:30 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.
org/archives/2013/04/college_student_1.htm; Bianca Bosker, How a Tinder Experiment
Lured 70 Guys to a Froyo Shop in Search of Dream Girl, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 13, 2013,
5:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/13/tinder-experiment_n_3077047.html;
Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity
Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1371 (2013).

1022

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:6

users.121 The ability to trust connections within a network is crucial for many
social purposes, including potentially (and perhaps ironically) the preservation
of anonymity from those outside of the network.122
A related violation of the network integrity principle is the misappropriation
of an individual’s name or likeness to leverage a message to the rest of the
network. For example, Facebook has settled a lawsuit claiming that the social
media company misappropriated users’ names and images in ads promoting its
“Friend Finder” tool. “Those ads said that the user had found other friends via
the friend finder tool. [Plaintiffs] argued that those messages violated California
law, which provides that companies can’t use the names or photos of
individuals in ads without their written consent.”123 In a similar dispute,
Facebook settled a lawsuit which challenged the legality of Facebook’s
“Sponsored Stories” program, which, according to Kashmir Hill “turns users
into spokespeople for companies and products in ads that are broadcast to their
friends. The disgruntled users claimed that Facebook didn’t have the right to use
people’s names and likenesses in ads without their explicit permission.”124
These kinds of practices threaten the integrity of a network by misrepresenting
the actions and intentions of other networked connections, thereby reducing
overall network trust.
Another practice that threatens network integrity is mandated networked
connections. For example, in trying to resolve evidentiary disputes involving
social media, some judges have suggested “friending” to get access to the
requested data.125 Some organizations have asked members to “friend” human

121 Robinson v. Match.com, Nos. 3:10–CV–2651–L, 3:11–CV–1354–L; 3:11–CV–

1913–L; 3:11–CV–02319–L; 3:11–CV–02322–L; and 3:11–CV–02323–L, 2012 WL
3263992, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 2012); see also Venkat Balasubramani, Lovelorn
Plaintiffs Strike Out Against Match.com—Robinson v. Match.com, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (Sept. 30, 2012, 12:12 PM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2012/09/lovelorn_
plaint.htm.
122 See Hal Hodson, Facebook Could Help Hide Your Identity, GIZMODO (Sept. 14,
2012, 6:11 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5943249/how-facebook-could-help-hide-your-identity.
123 Wendy Davis, Facebook, Consumers Settle “Friend Finder” Dispute, ONLINE
MEDIA DAILY (Sept. 14, 2012, 5:58 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/
182974/facebook-consumers-settle-friend-finder-dispute.html#axzz2WCvGuQqq.
124 Kashmir Hill, Facebook Will Pay $10 Million To Make Its “Sponsored Stories”
Problem Go Away, FORBES (June 18, 2012, 11:45 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kash
mirhill/2012/06/18/facebook-will-pay-10-million-to-make-its-sponsored-stories-problem-goaway/.
125 See, e.g., Venkat Balasubramani, Judge Offers To Facebook “Friend” Witnesses in
Order To Resolve Discovery Dispute—Barnes v. CUS Nashville, TECH. & MARKETING L.
BLOG (June 9, 2010, 10:56 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/06/judge_off
ers_to.htm. But see Venkat Balasubramani, Plaintiff Can’t Be Forced To Accept Defense
Counsel’s Facebook Friend Request in Personal Injury Case—Piccolo v. Paterson, TECH. &
MARKETING L. BLOG (May 19, 2011, 8:30 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2011/
05/court_says_plai.htm.
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resource directors.126 Such mandates can have the effect of corrupting the trust
that other individuals place in the network.
The inverse practice of banning networked connections could also corrupt
the integrity of a network by limiting its growth. For example, the Missouri
State Senate proposed a bill that would forbid students and teachers being
Facebook friends.127 That aspect of the bill was later deemed problematic and
was amended, which demonstrates, among other things, the societal interest in
supporting the network integrity principle.128
Asking friends to betray trust put in others can also be seen as a network
corruption. In September 2012, Facebook users were surprised to see a
notification box which displayed a picture of a user’s “friend” and asked if that
user was using his real name in accordance with Facebook’s “real name”
policy.129 One critic referred to the tactic and resulting dispute as “snitchgate,”
while Facebook clarified that it only wanted to gather anonymous information
about how the website was used, stating, “[w]e are always looking to gauge
how people use Facebook and represent themselves to better design our product
and systems. We analysed these surveys only using aggregate data and
responses had zero impact on any user’s account.”130 The public’s resistance to
being asked to report whether their networked connections are violating a social
network site’s terms of use agreement would seem to demonstrate the existence
and desirability of trust within a network. Finally, unauthorized surveillance can
threaten the integrity of a network for the same general reasons surveillance is
problematic, with the added reason that, if discovered, trust in the network will
be eroded.131
Potential rules or guidelines to effectuate the network integrity principle
include:
1) There should be no misrepresentations made to induce reliance on a false
identity of a networked connection.
126 See Erik Sherman, Required To “Friend” the Boss on Facebook? More States Say

No, AOL JOBS (June 7, 2013, 6:01 AM), http://jobs.aol.com/articles/2013/06/07/friend-theboss-facebook-laws/ (“According to the Council of State Governments, some companies are
asking employees to ‘“friend” a human resources director or coach.’ And many workers are,
understandably, nervous.”).
127 See, e.g., Charlie White, Missouri Forbids Teachers and Students To Be Facebook
Friends, MASHABLE (July 30, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/07/30/student-teacherfacebook/.
128 See Emil Protalinski, Missouri Senate Lets Teachers Be Facebook Friends with
Students, ZDNET (Sept. 15, 2011, 9:43 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/missourisenate-lets-teachers-be-facebook-friends-with-students/3687.
129 See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Stops Asking Users To “Snitch” on Friends with Fake
Names, FORBES (Sept. 24, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/
09/24/facebook-stops-asking-users-to-snitch-on-friends-with-fake-names/.
130 Id.
131 See Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934–35
(2013).
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2) A networked connection’s name or likeness should not be used without
consent to imply an endorsement of a third-party’s message to the
network.
3) There should be no unauthorized or hidden surveillance of a bound
network.
4) There should be no mandate or prohibition of networked connections.
The three principles identified here—boundary regulation, identity
integrity, and network integrity—cannot address every problematic aspect of
the social web. They are proposed merely as a common language and a set of
general policy objectives for stakeholders interacting with social data as the
front stage of the Internet.
A common language and articulation of policy objectives have been
missing in the amorphous and ill-defined context of the social web. This lack of
guidance is now becoming problematic with the growing necessity and reality
of government and organizational regulation of social data. While the proposed
principles have overlapping aspects, they are distinct enough to provide nuance
in discussions regarding the proper way to work with social data. The question
that remains, then, is how these principles might be implemented.

IV. IMPLEMENTING THE SOCIAL DATA PRINCIPLES
Like the FIPPs, the social data principles proposed in this essay are not
designed to be self-enforcing. Rather, they may be enforced or implemented in
various different ways at the statutory, regulatory, common law, and
organizational levels. The principles may be used to provide protection that is
tailored to specific contexts and the particular needs and capabilities of
organizations and individuals and should account for conflicting goals and
tolerable cost of implementation.
Robert Gellman has commented on the diverse ways in which the FIPPs
may be implemented, and the same holds true for the social data principles,
stating that “accountability can be met through many different mechanisms,
including criminal or civil penalties; national or provincial supervisory officials;
other administrative enforcement; various forms of self-regulation including
industry codes and privacy seals; formal privacy policies; compliance audits;
employee training; privacy officers at the data controller level; and other
methods.”132
The need to implement the social data principles can arise with any
organization that might be working with social data or when a practice becomes
problematic enough that regulatory guidance or prohibitions become

132 Gellman, supra note 1, at 23.
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necessary.133 Regardless of the regulatory mechanism, the social data principles
may be or are already being effectuated in four general ways: 1) disclosure
limitations, 2) design, 3) limitations on the use of social technologies, and 4)
limitations on requests for social data.

A. Disclosure Limitations
One of the most common ways to protect social data is to restrict authorized
recipients of social data from further disclosure. The most significant example
of this kind of limitation is the law of confidentiality, which is a central
component of many torts, statutes, regulations, contracts, evidentiary privileges,
professional codes, and company policies.
Confidentiality law is largely aimed at enforcing respect for relational
boundaries. That is, confidants are usually obligated to refrain from disclosing a
particular piece of information to other people outside of a confidential
relationship. However, disclosure limitations can also be crafted to respect
contextual and temporal boundaries as well. Those seeking to enforce the
boundary regulation principle could reinforce contextual boundaries by
restricting the disclosure of social data to certain contexts or keeping
information obscure. Agreements could allow certain disclosures so long as
they do not make information searchable or publicly accessible, identify the
discloser or subject, or clarify an opaque piece of information. In this way,
restrictions need not be absolute and can provide for dissemination to some, but
not others (or all). Alternatively, as social data ages, recipients could be
increasingly restricted in their disclosures in order to respect temporal
boundaries. As is the case with other forms of confidentiality, more burdensome
restrictions could be limited to particular, sensitive kinds of data.

B. Design
In many contexts, it might make more sense to implement the social media
principles through design. For example, Bobbi Duncan and Taylor McCormick
were outed as a function of Facebook’s privacy settings. The settings, of course,
could have been changed to make the group membership private, yet many
users, including the creator of the Queer Choir Facebook Group, have been
confused by increasingly complex privacy settings.134 The social data principles
could guide the design of these settings to make the data-protective choices
more intuitive for users.
133 See, e.g., Hunton & Williams LLP, FFIEC Issues Draft Guidance on Social Media,
PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013), http://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/
2013/01/articles/ffiec-issues-draft-guidance-on-social-media/.
134 See Johnson et al., supra note 34; Michelle Madejski et al., A Study of Privacy
Settings Errors in an Online Social Network (presented at the Fourth International Workshop
on SECurity and SOCial Networking, Mar. 19, 2012), available at https://www.cs.columbia.
edu/~smb/papers/fb-violations-sesoc.pdf.
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Many already consider the protection of information a design issue with
policy implications. Privacy by Design, that is “the philosophy and approach of
embedding privacy into the design specifications of various technologies,”
seeks to build “the principles of Fair Information Practices . . . into the design,
operation and management of information processing technologies and
systems.”135 In 2012, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) privacy framework,
Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Age of Rapid Change, strongly encouraged
companies to adopt privacy-by-design approaches to their business and
technical operations.136
Social data principles could also be implemented by privacy enhancing
technologies, known as PETs.137 For example, YouTube’s face-blurring tool
allows users to obfuscate their identity, which is consistent with the identity
integrity principle.138

C. Limitations on Use of Social Technologies
Many of the social data principles could be effectuated not by limiting the
disclosure of certain kinds of information, but, rather, by limiting the use of the
technology used to create that data. Laws and policies could prohibit imposters,
forced “friends,” misappropriation of name or likeness, and unauthorized
surveillance.
Many of these restrictions are common in workplace and academic social
media policies.139 They are also routinely prohibited in social media’s terms of
use. For example, in Facebook’s “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,”
users are not allowed to
bully, intimidate, or harass any user . . . tag users or send email invitations to
non-users without their consent . . . use Facebook to do anything unlawful,
misleading, malicious, or discriminatory . . . provide any false personal
information on Facebook . . . [or] post content or take any action on Facebook
that infringes or violates someone else’s rights or otherwise violates the law.140

135 CAVOUKIAN, supra note 20, at 1; see ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN: THE 7
FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), available at http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/
uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf; Rubinstein, supra note 20, at 1421 (“Privacy
by design is an amorphous concept.”); Rubinstein & Good, supra note 20, at 4.
136 FTC, supra note 20, at vii.
137 See Yang Wang & Alfred Kobsa, Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, in HANDBOOK
OF RESEARCH ON SOCIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITIES IN INFORMATION SECURITY 203
(Manish Gupta & Raj Sharman eds., 2006); John Argyrakis et al., Privacy Enhancing
Technologies: A Review, in ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT 282 (Roland Traunmüller ed., 2003).
138 Zoe Fox, YouTube Releases Face-Blurring Tool for Editing Graphic Footage,
MASHABLE (July 18, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/07/18/youtube-face-blur/.
139 See Boudreaux, supra note 115.
140 Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
legal/terms (last visited July 2, 2013).
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D. Limitations on Requests for Social Data
Finally, the principles could be effectuated by limiting requests for social
data. Such limitations are also commonly found in terms of use agreements. For
example, in Facebook’s “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,” users are
not allowed to “solicit login information or access an account belonging to
someone else.”141 Legislators are also passing laws in the spirit of this
guideline. Consider the previously mentioned spate of proposed and passed
legislation that prevents employers and school administrators from requesting
usernames and passwords and access to social media accounts.142 More
controversially, the ACLU brought a lawsuit in November 2012 “to block a
ballot measure that would require sex offenders to turn over information about
their Internet accounts to police.”143
Whereas disclosure limitations limit what “insiders” can do with social
data, this method of implementation applies primarily to “outsiders” seeking
social data. It supports both the boundary regulation principle, to the extent the
boundaries set by the user render social data inaccessible to outsiders, as well as
the network integrity principle by helping to maintain a sense of trust in the
network.

V. CONCLUSION
It is increasingly important to distinguish between the different threats to
privacy that arise from the conversion of our social interactions into data. The
regulatory and self-regulatory response to the “backstage” threat posed by
electronic databases developed partially thanks to the common language and
framework of the Fair Information Practice Principles. Yet, those seeking to
disclose and access information from the “front stage” of the social web, the
user interface, have no such guidelines to look to. This essay has proposed a set
of guiding principles for the protection of social data, the Boundary Regulation
Principle, the Identity Integrity Principle, and the Network Integrity Principle.
These principles could be implemented through various regulatory and selfregulatory efforts, including limitations on disclosure and use of the data,
limitations on requesting the data, and via design strategies.
Due to the extreme messiness of social interaction, the principles are
destined to remain imperfect and, at times, even internally conflicting. Yet if the
relevant stakeholders were to draw upon a set of common principles, they
would be better able to identify, justify, and distinguish between proposed

141 Id.
142 See supra Part II.B.
143 Brendan Sasso, ACLU Sues To Protect Online Privacy of Sex Offenders, HILL (Nov.

7, 2012, 4:31 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/266671-aclu-%20
sues-to-protect-online-privacy-of-sex-offenders#ixzz2WJLsfjYe.
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social data protections, which are important as our social interactions
increasingly endure.

